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Abstract
Privacy of information is a central concern in the debate about genetic testing. Two types of social
inefficiencies may occur when information about prevention and test status is private; genetic testing may
not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient.
The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with public insurance only, while the
second type of inefficiency is likely for those with a mix of public/private insurance.  This second type of
inefficiency is shown to be more important the less effective prevention is.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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1. Introduction
During the next few years genetic tests are likely to be introduced for many diseases. The tests will
be able to distinguish between high risk and low risk individuals at an asymptomatic stage of
disease. Presently, around fifteen to twenty tests are offered, including tests for Huntington's disease
and cystic fibrosis. Recently two important breast cancer genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2) have been
identified. The Food and Drug Administration in the United States recently approved a gene-based
test that may help to predict the recurrence of breast cancer. The number of tests is expected to
increase rapidly in a few years, in parallel to the mapping of the human genes. For instance, tests for
genes that imply an elevated risk of several types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases and Alzheimer
disease are already available or are expected to be available in the near future.
The information from gene based tests may be important for initiating measures for postponement
and prevention of disease. Genetic tests are also expected to have an important impact on the
organization of health systems and, in particular, health insurance.  There is a concern that insurers
can make use of information to deny coverage for individuals with an increased risk of disease or
require them to pay prohibitively high insurance premiums.  Regulation of the access to and the use
of information from genetic testing is therefore an important health policy issue in many countries.
In Norway, the law on the application of biotechnology prohibits requests for information on
individuals that stems from genetic tests. It is also prohibited to ask whether a genetic test has been
done. In the US a majority of the states have banned the use of genetic information by insurers. The
Congress in 1996 passed legislation that forbids group health organizations from denying coverage
on the basis of genetic information. Efforts are also made to extend the prohibition to all health
insurers and  ban insurers from raising premiums based on genetic data (Schwartz, 1998).HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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In this paper we study how the demand for genetic testing is likely to be influenced by the
regulation of information  insurers have access to. The insurance system considered is a mix of
public compulsory insurance and private supplementary insurance. Specially, we are interested in to
what extent possible inefficiencies depend on the mix of compulsory and voluntary insurance in a
system of health insurance. Two types of inefficiencies may occur. Firstly, tests may not be
undertaken when testing is socially efficient in the sense that testing implies a  pareto-improvement.
Secondly, tests may be undertaken when testing is socially inefficient. We show that the first type
of inefficiency is likely for systems with a high proportion of compulsory public insurance while
the second type of inefficiency is likely for systems with substantial private supplementary
insurance.
Section 2 introduces the basic insurance model. In section 3 the genetic test option is introduced and
the full information case is established as a benchmark. Section 4 assumes that costs of prevention
are private information and the institutional constraint that insurers have no access to genetic
information is imposed. In the concluding remarks in section 5 we suggest that an inefficiently high
level of testing is likely to occur in the coming years, since  genetic therapy is likely to lag behind
the development of genetic diagnostics, and hence, limit the scope for effective prevention.
2. The basic insurance model
Individuals are assumed to differ along two dimensions: The risk of having a disease in the future,
and the loss of income, !, if disease strikes. These two characteristics are assumed to be unrelated.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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The level of risk is assumed to be related to genetic disorders that may be revealed by means of
genetic testing.  Individuals belonging to group H have a risk, pH, while individuals in group L have
the risk, pL, where 0<pL< pH<1. The proportion of low risk individuals in the population is θ L and
the proportion of high risks is θ H, where 0< θ L,θ H <1 and θ L+ θ H =1. θ L and  θ H  are assumed to be
common knowledge.
All individuals are assumed to have the same exogenously determined income, w, as sick.   The loss
of income related to disease differs between individuals because their income or productivity as
healthy is assumed to differ. The higher the productivity as healthy, the greater is the loss of
income, !, as sick. As mentioned above, the distribution of !  is the same in the group H as it is in
the group L.
By means of insurance, income can be transferred from the healthy state to the state of poor health.
In this specific context insurance can be thought of as covering the costs of medical treatment
necessary to (partly or fully) compensate the loss of income due to illness.
There are two types of insurance; compulsory public insurance and voluntary private insurance. An
important distinction is whether private insurance is considered to be a supplement or an alternative
to public insurance. A few examples may clarify the distinction. A person with symptoms of disease
and with public coverage is likely to make use of the public insurance in the first contact with a
physician.  The visit may result in diagnosis and treatment or a referral to a specialist for further
diagnostics and treatment. A referral may be accompanied by a waiting time before a specialist can
be seen. The waiting time may be shortened by means of privately funded provision of health
services.  A privately funded specialist is then an alternative to a publicly funded. Once a diagnosisHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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is made, treatment may or may not be provided by the public sector. For instance, expensive
treatment may be rationed and some patients with treatment indications may be turned down. The
private sector may then be a supplement for those patients experiencing rationing in the public
sector.  Also, a waiting time for publicly funded treatment may occur.  The waiting list may be
bypassed by means of privately funded treatment. In this case private care is an alternative to the
publicly funded care.  Hence, we see that some parts of privately funded health services may be
considered as an alternative to publicly funded services, while others may be considered as a
supplement. For instance, Besley, Hall and Preston (1998) consider UK private health insurance to
be somewhere between the two stylised alternatives.
In this paper we consider private health insurance as a supplement to compulsory public insurance.
Compulsory public insurance is assumed to cover a portion x ≤  ! of the loss, where x is assumed to
be exogenous and equal for all
1. Hence, the higher the productivity as healthy, the lower is the
proportion of the loss covered by public insurance. The loss from poor health is in the analysis
restricted to the loss of income. Good health obviously has a value in itself, but this component is
not drawn into the analysis at the present stage.
Insurers are assumed to break even. In a competitive insurance market where insurers are risk
neutral expected profit maximisers, expected profits will be driven to zero. If the insurer is the
public sector or a private non-profit institution, the zero expected profit is imposed as an
institutional constraint or by the implication of political decisions. Furthermore, we ignore
administrative costs. Full insurance can then be offered at actuarially fair rates.
                                                
1 It is assumed that the lowest !-value in the distribution is equal to or larger than x. Nothing of importance would be
changed if we instead had assumed that some !-values were lower than x, and that the public insurance for these cases
covered the whole loss !.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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The premium paid for public insurance is assumed to be independent of individual risk. Each
individual is assumed to pay an equal premium, with a calculated risk equal to the average
population risk, pHL = θ HpH + θ LpL, and a premium equal to pHLx.
Voluntary private insurance covers loss in excess of x at an actuarially fair premium rate.
A private insurance policy, c(pt  , k),  is characterised by the probability of disease, pt , that
determines the premium as a proportion of the covered loss, and the proportion of the loss, k∈ [0,1],
that is covered. Consumers are assumed to choose the policy that maximises their expected utility,
given the public coverage.  The expected utility of an insurance policy for a person with probability
of disease equal to p, is:
v[(c(pt,k), p] = (1-p)u(w - pHLx - pt k(!-x) + !) +  p u(w - pHLx - pt k(!-x) +  x + k(!-x))
where u(w - pHLx - pt k(!-x) + !) is the utility as healthy and u(w - pHLx - pt k(!-x) +  x + k(!-x)) is
the utility when unhealthy. We assume risk aversion, implying that the marginal utility of wealth is
declining with the amount of wealth. Hence, u( ⋅  ) is strictly concave.
We shall assume that prior to the introduction of genetic testing, nobody knows his true risk type.
Hence, initially, as uninformed, the whole population is assumed to have an identical perception of
their own risk equal to a weighted average of the actual risk of the two groups;  pHL = θ HpH + θ LpL.
Hence, the premium rate for private insurance is equal to the premium rate for public insurance.
FIGURE 1
In figure 1, income in the unhealthy state is measured along the horizontal axis and income in the
healthy state along the vertical axis. Full insurance coverage, i.e. an equal income in both states, is
illustrated with the 45-degree line from the origin.  The vertical line through E shows the range of
incomes in the healthy and the unhealthy state for a person with public insurance only andHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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alternative values of the loss, !.  A person with an income point located at the intersection between
this vertical line and the 45-degree line from the origin has a loss as sick that gives full coverage
from the public insurance, !=x. Those with incomes in the healthy state above the 45- degree line
from the origin after public insurance is accounted for (!-x>0), say point E in figure 1, are not fully
covered by public insurance. EA shows all combinations of income in the two states compatible
with actuarially fair insurance for the low risk group, and EB similarly for the high risk group. EB is
steeper than EA because the high risk group must forego more income than the low risk group in
the healthy state to have one dollar in the unhealthy state because of the higher risk of ending in the
unhealthy state. EC describes feasible combinations of income in the two states when both groups
pay an equal premium calculated on basis of the weighted average risk of the population,  pHL. Risk
averse uninformed consumers prefer full insurance when premiums are actuarially fair. Since no
one is assumed to know his risk type prior to genetic testing, pHL , corresponds to the apparently
actuarial fair premium rate.  Hence, C describes the optimal income in the two states with
compulsory insurance and supplementary private insurance for a person located at point E with
public insurance only.
3. Test status, test result and prevention as public information
The purpose of genetic testing is to discover disease in an asymptomatic stage, in order to take
preventive measures to reduce the probability of contracting the disease. Whether prevention is
available and likely to be demanded, is therefore an important factor in determining the demand for
predictive testing. Two cost components may be involved in prevention. The first component is the
costs of providing professional medical care. To simplify the exposition, we shall set these costs
equal to zero and comment on the influence of this assumption in the concluding remarks. TheHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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second cost component is personal costs related to preventive measures. These costs are of two
kinds. The first kind is costs related to activities that can easily be observed, for instance travelling
and absence from work to attend disease prevention programmes. The other kind of personal costs
is unobservable for others than the person who carries the costs.  Examples are time used in
preparation of a special diet and pain and discomfort experienced from preventive measures as
healthy diet and physical exercise.
Assume that effective prevention exists. If spH is the probability of having the disease in spite of
prevention, effective prevention requires s<1. With all information public, an individual  insurance
contract can be made contingent upon both test status and upon whether prevention is undertaken.
With prevention, the initial point for the high risk group moves from E to E´ in figure 2, because
individual costs of prevention accrues ex ante and hence, diminish income in both states.
FIGURE 2
To simplify the exposition we assume that test costs equal zero.  Assume further that testing is
socially efficient, which means that expected income with test and prevention is greater than
expected income without test and prevention, i.e. that -(sph!+γ )>-ph!, where the monetary
equivalent of personal costs of prevention is denoted by γ. Τ his condition may be rewritten as (1-
s)ph!>γ , i.e. that testing is socially efficient if the increase in expected income due to testing is
larger than the monetary equivalent of personal costs of prevention. We further assume that the
effect of prevention is less favourable than bringing a high-risk person to same risk level as a low
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FIGURE 2
Figure 2 illustrates efficient testing. The line E´F shows the collection of actuarially fair insurance
contracts for a high-risk person who has taken preventive measures. We see that the line E´F
intersects the 45-degree line for a higher income than the line EB. Hence, the certainty equivalent
income with prevention is higher than without. The line E´F is however steeper than the line EA,
that shows the insurance terms for a low risk person.
Private supplementary insurance with full coverage can be offered for all alternative probabilities of
disease. c(pHL,1) (point C in figure 2) is offered if a person chooses to stay uninformed , c(pH,1)
 
(point B) if a positive test shows up and no prevention is undertaken, c(spH,1) (point F) if positive
test and prevention and c(pL,1) (point A)  if a negative test occurs.
An individual will choose to acquire information from testing if the expected utility with test is
greater or equal than the expected utility as uninformed
2.  If a positive test turns out, we see from
figure 2 that the individually optimal choice for a person with supplementary insurance is to
undertake prevention.  Hence, the optimal choice for an individual corresponds to social efficiency.
The existence of risk aversion may still imply that a person chooses to stay uninformed. To
undertake the test is for an individual a lottery. One may win and go to A or lose and go to F, while
one without the test obtains C. Testing is less likely to be chosen the larger s is and the larger γ  is,
since the loss that comes from a positive test is then larger. Likewise, testing is less likely to be
chosen the more risk averse a person is.
                                                
2 Our approach is in the same vein as Doherty and Thistle (1996), but our institutional set-up is somewhat richer since
we allow for prevention and a mix of private and public insurance.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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Compulsory insurance offers full coverage independent of test status and prevention. The premium
reduction  from prevention is divided equally among all n individuals.  For  large n an individual's
share in the premium reduction is negligible. Prevention will then not be undertaken if  γ  >0,
although prevention may be socially efficient.
In the full information case the government can encourage socially efficient testing and prevention
by compensating individuals for personal costs. A person with only  public insurance is indifferent
between staying uninformed and undertaking testing and prevention when
3:
uw p x uw p x uw p x r HL L HL H HL () () ( ) −+ = −+ + −+ − + !!! θθ γ
where the premium reduction is assumed to be negligible and r  is the compensation for undertaking
prevention. We see that indifference is fulfilled for r = γ .  Problems in practice are likely to arise
since individual variation in γ  is likely to occur.
For a person with mixed public and private insurance the public compensation must fulfil (see
footnote 3):
uw p uw p x p x
uw p x s p x r
HL L HL L
HH L H
() ( ( ) )
(( ) )
−+ = −−− + +





For this case we cannot unambiguously sign r-γ .  To see that r>γ  is possible, consider the case in
which s is marginally below 1 and γ  is zero. In this case testing is socially efficient. However, with
strong risk aversion it is individually optimal to choose not to be tested if r=0, since the gain in
expected income (due to s<1) will be dominated by the fact that testing is a type of lottery.  Thus, in
order to induce testing one must have r>0, i.e. r>γ .
                                                
3 Utility is the same whether healthy or sick in the present case of full information. when comparing the consequences
of testing or not, it is therefore sufficient to consider the healthy state of the two cases.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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To see that r<γ  is possible, consider the limiting case of risk neutrality. In this case the equation
above implies
(( ) ) ( ( ) ) HL L HL L H HL H wp wpxp x wpxs p x r θθ γ −+ =−−− + + −− − + − + ! ! !! !!
(1 ) ( ) 0 H rs p x γ −= − − > !
Using  θ H + θ L =1 and pHL = θ Η pH + θ LpL  we can rewrite this as
which proves that r<γ  for this case.
The full information case is considered as a benchmark for the further analysis where private
information is assumed either because of characteristics of the preventive activities or because of
regulation imposed on the insurance market.
4. Test status, test result and prevention as private information
In this case the prevention an individual undertakes is assumed to be his private information.
Accordingly, also the personal cost of prevention is private information. Hence, an insurance
contract cannot be made contingent on whether prevention is undertaken.  We also impose the
institutional constraint that insurers have no access to information about whether a person is tested.
Since those tested then cannot be distinguished from those not tested, insurance contracts can
neither be contingent on whether a person is tested nor the test result.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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FIGURE 3
Assume that effective prevention exists, and hence, s<1. Let us first study the optimal decisions for
the group with private supplementary insurance.  Assume that insurers expect consumers to be
informed of whether they are H (high-risk) or L (low-risk). With prevention the initial point for the
high-risk group moves from E to E´ because of individual costs of prevention. The indifference
curve for group H (high-risk without prevention), IH-IH in figure 3, is steeper than the indifference
curve for group SH (high-risk with prevention), IsH-IsH, because the probability of illness is smaller
with prevention than without, and hence, with prevention the consumer is willing to forgo less
income in the healthy state to obtain a marginal dollar in the unhealthy state. The best coverage that
can be offered at actuarially fair terms for the high risk group with prevention c(spH, k'), with k'<1
is illustrated by D´ in figure 3. Here the incentive constraint v[c(spH, k'), spH ] = v[c(spH, k'), pH ]  is
fulfilled. Any better coverage would make it beneficial not to prevent and choose the contract made
for those who prevent, i.e.  v[c(spH, k*), spH ] < v[c(spH, k*), pH ] for k*>k'. The second contract in
the menu is characterized  by the intersection, shown by the point A´, between IsH-IsH and the line
EA describing the collection of actuarially fair contracts for the low risk group. Denote this contract
c(pl, k''), where 0<k´´<k´<1.  The incentive constraints v[c(pSH, k'), spH ] = v[c(pL, k''), spH ] and
v[c(pSH, k'), pL ] < v[c(pL, k''), pL ] is then fulfilled. Any better coverage for the low risks will
encourage the sH group to pretend they are low risks. Consumers who are uninformed, will
purchase c(spH, k') or c(pL, k'').
In an appendix we show that a consumer’s best choice is to acquire information through testing and
do prevention if the test result turns out to be positive. The intuitive reason is this:
Assume that I choose c(spH, k') as uninformed. With the information acquired through testing, I
shall know whether I am a low risk or a high-risk individual.  If it turns out that I have low risk, IHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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can choose a better contract than c(spH, k'), namely c(pL, k''). If it turns out that I am high risk, I can
do equally well as I could as uninformed by means of prevention.  We therefore have an
equilibrium (a Nash equilibrium) where the insurer’s expectations of testing is fulfilled, with all the
low risks located in A´ and all high risks (all high risks choose prevention) in D´.  A similar
reasoning applies if c(pL, k'') is chosen as uninformed.
Doherty and Thistle (1996) show that if the insurer does not expect consumers to be tested, no
equilibrium exists. Doherty and Thistle do not consider the availability of preventive measures.
Since availability of prevention makes testing more attractive, their result also applies to the present
model.
Compared to the full information contract there is a social loss since the insurance coverage for both
groups declines. If there are not too many high-risk individuals in the population, even the low-risk
group is worse off because the loss from less insurance coverage outweighs the gain from fewer
subsidies to the high-risk group.
Even without effective prevention (s=1) the optimal choice for the mixed public/private insured
group is to choose genetic testing. Hence, genetic testing will be chosen also when it is socially
inefficient.
The premium for the group with compulsory public insurance is assumed to be independent of their
individual risk. This means that the self-selection mechanism used by the private insurer is not
applicable to the public insurer. Hence, when preventive costs are private information, socially
efficient testing is not likely to be undertaken by those with public insurance only when personal
costs of prevention occur.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
16
5. Concluding remarks
In the health policy debate about genetic testing the privacy of information is a central concern. In
this paper we have discussed the impact on genetic testing of regulating insurers' access to genetic
information. The insurance system considered is a mix of public compulsory insurance and private
supplementary insurance.
Two types of social inefficiencies may occur when information about prevention and test status is
private;  genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be
done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for those
publicly insured, while the second type of inefficiency is likely for those with a mix of
public/private insurance. Hence, regulations imposed to protecting individuals from insurers' use of
genetic information, may have the side effect that genetic tests are done in a larger scale than is
socially efficient.
This second type of inefficiency is likely to be more important the less effective prevention is.
Genetic tests are likely to be offered before effective treatment of genetic disorders are available
(see for instance, Schwartz, 1998). The potential social inefficiency attached to this uneven
development of technologies is likely to be more prevalent the less compulsory insurance that a
system contains.
Tabarrok (1994) has argued that the potentially negative effects of predictive testing on insurance
coverage and income distribution could be avoided by introducing compulsory insurance against theHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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financial consequences of becoming high risk when a person decides to be tested, i.e. genetic
insurance. It is claimed that this suggestion would make the implementation of socially beneficial
testing more likely. A crucial question, then, is whether the uninformed consumers who buy
insurance against the loss of being identified as high risk are, in fact, uninformed. With the
introduction of inexpensive tests that are easy to administer, it is likely that a proportion of those
who present themselves as uninformed are in fact informed high-risk individuals who have already
been tested. An adverse selection problem is then likely to occur.
One solution to the problem of adverse selection mentioned above could be to have compulsory
insurance against the financial consequences of a test result for all people, whether they decide to
test themselves or not. A compulsory insurance of this type could be practically organised as
follows. The basic rules for income taxation could be combined with rules for tax reductions
(according to a publicly known set of standards) that are given to persons who can document that
they are of high-risk types. Such tax reductions according to criteria beyond the control of the
individual are often used, e.g. for old or disability in Norway. A tax system of this kind would to a
large extent eliminate the distributional reasons often given for why one might wish to regulate the
insurance companies’ access to and the use of information from genetic testing to differentiate
insurance contracts across risk groups.
This paper contains assumptions that should be modified and explored in future research. We
assumed that private insurance is a supplement to compulsory insurance. It should be studied
whether it makes any difference for our conclusions if private insurance is assumed as an
alternative. We also considered the level of public insurance as exogenously determined. An
interesting extension would be to allow for an interaction between the level of private insurance and
public insurance. For instance, the decision to buy private insurance may have an impact on theHERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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level of public insurance a consumer prefers and hence, his voting behaviour.
We also assumed that all consumers consider their health risk to be average prior to genetic testing.
As mentioned above in connection with the possibility of insurance against the financial
consequences of testing, this is not quite realistic.  For instance, family history may be used to
distinguish between high risk and low risk individuals. An important modification is then to allow
for that consumers have some information of their risk type ex ante.
Finally, we assumed no preferences for good health, per se. The motivation for good health was
confined to preferences for income. The consequences of including health as a separate argument in
the utility function should be explored in future work.HERO Working Paper 1999:1 Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing
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Appendix:
Derivation of consumer’s best choice with test status, test result and
prevention as private information
The consumer's choice is among the two alternatives staying uninformed with insurance contract c´L
or c´SH or do testing and prevention and choose the contract contingent on the test result. Let I be the
difference between the expected utility of doing the test and the expected utility of being
uninformed and assume first that the individual chooses c´SH as uninformed:
I v cp v c p v cp
p u wpxp p u wpxp
puw p x p p uw p x p
pp u w p x p
pp u w p x p
H SH SH L L L SH U
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β ' is the insured loss in  contract c'SH. β '' is the insured loss in  contract c'L
ρ ' is the uninsured loss in  contract c'SH. ρ '' is the uninsured loss in  contract c'L
By similar reasoning it may be shown that I>0 also if the consumer chooses c´L as uninformed.